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Inside the Digital Revolution
Heather Brooke
Heather Brooke is a professor in the department of journalism at City, University of London and she 
recently gained a PhD on the topic of freedom of information and the informed citizen in a democracy. 
Technology and transparency combined to create the digital revolution, which in 
turn has ushered in a new form of  monitory democracy. Communicative abun-
dance and global interconnection mean the democratic franchise can expand and 
deepen, but the author argues that it matters who is made transparent and for 
what purpose. Content and context matter. Technology and transparency can 
be used to strengthen democracy by opening up government to citizens, but the 
same tools can also be used by the state to surveil and disempower citizens, there-
by damaging democracy. The author uses three case studies to discuss the impact 
of  digitizing information on power relations between citizens and states. First, 
her observations as the journalist and litigant in the legal case that forced the 
digitization of  UK parliamentary expense records, which when leaked created 
one of  the biggest political scandals in that country for decades. Second, she ob-
tained the entire set of  U.S. diplomatic cables and reported on their contents for 
the Guardian. Lastly, she served as a member of  the Independent Surveillance 
Review Panel, set up by the UK government to investigate allegations made by 
Edward Snowden that the UK and U.S. governments were conducting mass sur-
veillance programs that were potentially illegal and lacked adequate oversight. 
The case studies show how journalism is integral not only to identifying useful 
civic information but also maximizing the public good from leaked information 
while minimizing harm.
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Thomas Paine described pre-Enlightenment government as “an assumption of  power, for the aggrandizement of  itself.” By contrast the Enlightenment 
proposed a political system that was “a delegation of  power, for the common 
benefit of  society.”1 That promise never appeared more real than when new 
digital technologies combined with transparency policies to create the digital 
revolution. Technology enabled instant, free, and global communication and 
zero-cost duplication and dissemination, while transparency emerged as the an-
tidote to corruption, injustice, abuse of  power, and even inefficiency. If  secrecy 
was not the sole cause of  these societal ailments, it was seen as the necessary 
precondition for their existence, and “right to know” laws swept across the globe. 
The digitization of  information enabled industrial-scale leaks and I show in this 
paper how a series of  mega-leaks pulled back the curtain on elite structures of  
governance while illuminating the true costs of  secrecy and how it can often 
hinder public accountability of  public resources. 
Technology and transparency were both essential in the creation of  the digital 
revolution as they dramatically affected information flows between citizen and 
state, however early utopian ideas (including the author’s own) that these chang-
es inherently favored democracy were premature. Technology and transparency 
can be used to strengthen democracy by opening up government to citizens, but 
the same tools can also be used by the state to surveil and disempower citizens, 
thereby damaging democracy. The communications abundance of  the digital 
revolution can democratize the public sphere by giving a platform to a wide 
range of  voices, or it can create a climate where prejudice and propaganda run 
rampant. In order for technology and transparency to expand and strengthen de-
mocracy it matters who is made transparent and how technology is used. Content 
and context matter.
This article examines the political impact of  the digital revolution using three 
case studies to illustrate the way digital technology and transparency combined 
to affect power relations between citizens and the state. After laying out a de-
scription of  technology and then transparency, I will turn to the first case study: 
my work as the journalist and litigant in the freedom of  information case that 
forced the digitization of  UK parliamentary expense records, which when even-
tually published, created one of  the biggest political upheavals in that country for 
decades. Second, I examine the leak and publication of  251,287 U.S. diplomatic 
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cables, which I obtained and reported on for the Guardian. Lastly, I discuss the 
revelations, by National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden, 
of  mass surveillance by the UK and U.S. governments. What these case studies 
show is how the digital revolution is not only disrupting traditional forms of  
political power but challenging our very ideas about democracy. Possession and 
control of  information allows us to demarcate who controls or influences the po-
litical system, and these battles over information are a way of  testing the promise 
and practice of  democracy to see how well citizens can access and participate in 
the political system. As in the case of  the Members of  Parliament (MPs) ex-
penses scandal, the rhetoric of  democracy was not matched in practice. Rather, 
the scandal revealed an elitist political system in need of  substantial democratic 
reform. 
Citizens are no longer reliant on elected officials or government institutions to 
represent their interests, but have a wide variety of  instant and global tools at 
their disposal to broadcast their views. Traditional institutions and politicians are 
under pressure to adapt to this new democratic intensity, though the case studies 
show the difficulty in practicing what they preach when it comes to democracy. 
Technology—The Revolution Will Be Digitized
Digitization has enabled information about government decisionmaking, poli-
cies, and outcomes to be disclosed and distributed in new formats on an unprec-
edented scale. There are three main revolutionary aspects of  digital technology: 
1. Zero-cost duplication
2. Zero-cost dissemination 
3. Instant and free global communication
Digital data is expressed as a series of  the digits 0 and 1. That sounds obvious 
but the remarkable thing about data represented in this way is its ethereality. 
The physical component is the server where bits of  data are stored, but in its 
transmission to another server the data has no physical mass. Thus digital data 
can be shared and spread quickly and easily, just like an idea or thought. In the 
analog age, it cost money to share information as it meant producing another 
physical copy. In the digital age, the physicality has been eliminated. Now it 
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costs money not to share data. As a result, duplication and dissemination be-
come the default and any person or organization that wants to impede this free 
flow of  information has to spend considerable amounts of  money and resources 
to do so. Digitization enables huge volumes of  data to be compiled, stored, and 
analyzed quickly, at a vastly reduced cost. The ratio of  data to matter on a stone 
tablet is poor. It gets better with paper and better still using magnetic ribbons. 
An exponential increase occurs with the shift to digital, which can be stored 
on disks, USB sticks, and microchips. Two major technological advances—in 
semiconductor manufacturing and fiber-optic communications—have made it 
possible for large volumes of  information to be hosted on ever smaller physical 
components. An EMC-funded May 2010 report “The Digital Universe Decade – 
Are You Ready?” from American market research firm IDC estimated the 2010 
volume of  data at 1.2 million petabytes, or 1.2 zettabytes (which is 1,200 exa-
bytes), which works out to 6.8 exabytes every two days. These are mind-boggling 
amounts. 
This information is not static. The Internet and social networks allow it to be 
spread far and wide, often in real time.2 Albert Meijer calls this phenomenon 
“computer-mediated transparency”’ and Grimmelikhuijsen writes that it is now 
an “essential part of  modern-day government transparency.”3 As I wrote in the 
introduction to The Revolution Will be Digitised: 
 
We are at an extraordinary moment in human history: never 
before has the possibility of  true democracy been so close to re-
alisation. As the cost of  publishing and duplication has dropped 
to near zero, a truly free press, and a truly informed public, 
becomes a reality. A new Information Enlightenment is dawn-
ing where knowledge flows freely, beyond national boundaries. 
Technology is breaking down traditional barriers of  status, class, 
power, wealth and geography, replacing them with an ethos of  
collaboration and transparency.4 
Such an assessment now seems overly optimistic. Not only does knowledge flow 
freely but we have ample evidence that so, too, does ignorance, propaganda, and 
outright lies. Australian political and media scholar John Keane describes this as 
the era of  “communicative abundance” and there are, as yet, no adequately ro-
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bust forms of  information quality control.5 A crucial issue in the age of  commu-
nicative abundance will be to find a way to balance quality control and the free 
flow of  information while avoiding censorship and the spread of  propaganda 
and lies. Changes in communications technology often lead to political changes. 
If  assembly democracy is linked to the spoken word and repre-
sentative democracy to print culture, today’s democracy - what 
Keane calls “monitory democracy” - emerges with the rise of  
multimedia society.6
I discuss “monitory democracy” in more detail below but suffice to say, technol-
ogy has often been linked with political revolutions. Karl Marx credited the rail-
ways with accelerating the ability of  workers to communicate and unite: “And 
that union, to attain which the burghers of  the Middle Ages with their miserable 
highways required centuries, the modern proletarians by means of  railways 
achieve in a few years.”7 This is because informed citizens are better able to chal-
lenge hierarchies as I show in the first two case studies below. It is not an empty 
cliché to say that knowledge is power. The powerful know this and expend vast 
resources attempting to gather information and control its flow. 
Power is more than communication, and communication is more 
than power. But power relies on the control of  communication, 
as counterpower depends on breaking through such control. 
And mass communication, the communication that potentially 
reaches society at large, is shaped and managed by power rela-
tionships, rooted in the business of  media and the politics of  the 
state. Communication power is at the heart of  the structure and 
dynamics of  society.8
The emergence of  so many instant and free messaging services using text, voice, 
and video “has no historical precedent,” and is truly revolutionary in ways that 
we are just beginning to understand.9 
It is also worth noting the challenge nation-states face from the digital revolution 
as they seek ways to control national information and communication flow in 
a global, interconnected world. How does an English High Court judge enforce 
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contempt of  court restrictions when the writer is, for example, Australian and 
the publication is via the American company Twitter operating under the First 
Amendment? One solution has been to extend national laws to the world’s 
citizenry, as America does with the American Millennium Copyright Act, but a 
fairer system might be to create international norms as suggested by Dinwood-
ie.10 The same is true for online crimes, which can occur on platforms with a 
different national jurisdiction than that of  the user. There are growing cross-bor-
der publics debating global issues such as women’s rights and climate change, 
but these online global voices have not yet found an adequate body politic.11   
Technology and Democracy
There are two main types of  democracy: “participatory” or “direct” democracy 
involves the direct participation of  all citizens who vote on decisions that affect 
their lives, and “indirect” or “representative” democracy in which the people 
elect a representative to decide matters on their behalf.12 There is a view that 
“party-centered representative democracy has now been substantially supple-
mented (but not replaced) with multiple forms of  representing the public and 
holding governments accountable,” writes Michael Schudson in The Rise of  the 
Right to Know.13 This new type of  democracy has been given different names: 
“post-representative,” “trans-legislative” (as a description of  wider representa-
tion that is not exclusively centered on elections and legislatures), or what John 
Keane calls “monitory democracy.”14 Keane sees an evolution of  democracy 
starting with the “assembly democracy” of  ancient Greece to “representative 
democracy” of  the eighteenth century, and now “monitory democracy,” each 
prefaced by an innovation in communications technology. Monitory democ-
racy involves “surveys, focus groups, deliberative polling, online petitions and 
audience and customer voting,” among other things.15 I would also add to this 
list journalism and right to information laws. These methods of  participation 
and accountability are aided by the distributed communications network of  the 
Internet and often run simultaneously parallel and outside the traditional mech-
anisms of  party-based representation and institutional oversight. Often they 
are thought by citizens to be superior to formal institutional oversight, which 
is increasingly seen as impotent or co-opted. Aldrich wrote presciently in 2009 
before the mega-leaks of  WikiLeaks and Snowden, “with formalised national 
systems of  intelligence accountability looking weaker, informal accountability 
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through revelations provided by a globalised media in tandem with activists and 
whistleblowers, may become more important.”16
The rise of  monitory democracy has not always been embraced by politicians 
and political institutions, including in the West as outlined in the case studies be-
low. Not everyone likes to be scrutinized even if  “in the era of  monitory democ-
racy, the constant public scrutiny of  power by hosts of  differently sized monitory 
bodies with footprints large and small makes it the most energetic, most dynamic 
form of  democracy ever.”17 Democratic governments around the world are strug-
gling to adapt to this potent new form of  democracy. 
Transparency
Supporting and enhancing the new technologies of  communication and sharing 
are new laws and norms on transparency, specifically the Freedom of  Infor-
mation Act (FOIA) and other right to information (RTI) laws. If  technology 
increased the means and methods for greater communication, then these laws 
provided greater content. Possession and control of  information allows us to 
demarcate who controls or influences the political system. Freedom of  informa-
tion is rooted in Enlightenment values and contains a key principle of  democra-
cy; there must be access to information for all equally, or as Bavarian professor 
Adam Weishaupt argued in 1786, “Aufklärung um andere wieder aufzuklären, giebt 
Freyheit”—only enlightenment to enlighten others generates freedom.18 Democ-
racy scholar Robert Dahl lists as one of  the five criteria for measuring democra-
cy “enlightened understanding,” which is the ability of  citizens to be meaning-
fully informed about matters up for debate or decision.19
The increase in government openness since 1989 “is an accepted trend that com-
mands more or less universal assent among academic analysts.”20 Transparency 
has become a consensual and administrative norm in public life according to 
many scholars.21 Transparency is “essentially a power-reducing mechanism” so it 
matters who is made transparent. If  rulers are made so, then citizens are empow-
ered, however if  citizens are made so, then they are disempowered.22 
Openness is a modern invention according to Schudson. It is a “key element in 
the transformation of  politics, society and culture from the late 1950s through 
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the 1970s.”23 Schudson gives numerous examples of  how openness became a 
cultural phenomenon in media, popular culture, economy, and everyday life: 
the creation of  the Securities and Exchange Commission; the publication of  the 
Kinsey reports in 1948 and 1953 on adult sexual behavior; Daniel Ellsberg’s re-
lease of  the Pentagon Papers to newspapers in 1971; the Automobile Disclosure 
Act of  1958 requiring itemized pricing stickers on car windows, and the Auto-
mobile Safety Act and Truth in Packaging of  1966 (both spearheaded by con-
sumer rights campaigner Ralph Nader). However, other academics view trans-
parency as one of  the oldest ideas in political thought, stemming from beliefs of  
intrinsic equality in existence since at least classical Greece.24 Pericles of  Athens 
is famous for his remarks around 430 BC in which he speaks of  citizens’ right to 
know: “Although only a few may originate a policy, we are all able to judge it.”25 
Sweden was the first to enact FOI in law in 1766, but the United States is consid-
ered to have been the “traditional proponent of  transparency.”26 The U.S. Free-
dom of  Information Act, “weak as it was when passed in 1966, was a landmark 
development towards a more open society.”27 The Watergate scandal became 
a “symbolic catalyst for a new law” and in 1974 the act was amended and 
strengthened.28 The importance of  the U.S. law cannot be overstated. The United 
States had produced “a small miracle for the world” that became the model 
for global FOI laws.29 It marked the beginning of  what is called the “Openness 
Revolution” and while FOI may have begun as a means to reign in the growing 
state’s administrative power, it soon expanded as a necessary means of  ensur-
ing other rights, most notably in the FOI campaigns of  India and South Africa 
where secrecy bred corruption so endemic it left vulnerable citizens deprived of  
life’s essentials such as food, water, and work.30 In the 1990s only about a dozen 
countries had FOI laws. By 2006 there were 70 countries and in 2012 there were 
93.31
Additionally, the American system of  corporate disclosure was, by the 1990s, 
seen as the best economic model, which added to transparency’s cache. While 
recent corporate scandals have cast doubt on the adequacy of  these measures, 
more transparency is seen as the solution. The World Bank and IMF also adopt-
ed disclosure policies as a means to fight corruption, and the leading anticorrup-
tion organization in the world was set up in 1993 with the name Transparency 
International. If  secrecy was the ailment, transparency was increasingly seen as 
a “simple solution to complex problems,” with “attractive palliative qualities for 
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politicians and CEOs who want to be seen to be doing rather than reflecting.”32 
The latest incarnation of  freedom of  information came with digitization and the 
“Open Data” movement, which has led to new collaborations between citizen 
and state though not always beneficial to the citizen.33 Evgeny Morozov notes 
how the Hungarian cities of  Budapest and Szeged provide online machine-read-
able transit schedules. It is government data and it is open, but few would agree 
this makes the Hungarian government open. In fact it is the opposite, with cuts 
to freedom of  information and the press. We should beware of  cheerleading 
open data as it allows “some governments to claim progress where there is none, 
while stalling on important reforms.”34 
Transparency and Technology as Tools for Democracy
The power of  digitization to disrupt political systems is clearly seen in the MPs’ 
expenses scandal, reaching a climax in 2009. What we witnessed in Britain was 
a culture clash between parliamentary officials who believed in their right to 
rule without public prying, confronted by a citizenry no longer content with that 
arrangement and newly empowered by the leak of  a digitized data set of  politi-
cians’ expenses. 
MPs’ Expenses
Although I initially trained as a journalist in the United States, the majority of  
my investigative journalism was conducted in the UK. I was aware of  the type of  
documentation that underlay politicians’ expense claims because I had seen sim-
ilar as a reporter covering the Washington State Legislature in 1992. American 
journalism, both daily and investigative, is based largely on public records. This 
was not the case in the UK where there was no public right to access official 
information until implementation of  the Freedom of  Information Act in 2005. 
British journalists, I discovered, had different methods of  obtaining information, 
some more illegitimate than others.35 
I used Britain’s new FOI law as a means of  uncovering information and also to 
test the promise and practice of  democracy. As a research tool FOI is a symbol-
ic and political act, a form of  empowerment, and I used it as such to enlighten 
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both myself  and society. It may exist in “the humdrum world of  administrative 
laws” but it is a “foundational element of  democratic participation and account-
ability” and as such forms an aspect of  monitory democracy.36 From 2005 until 
mid-2010, I filed approximately 500 FOIs with varying levels of  success. My first 
request to Parliament was on 2 February 2004 when I began an email correspon-
dence with the FOI officer of  Parliament.37 I asked for MPs’ expenses and she 
told me they would be published in October 2004. However, what came out on 
that date were only bulk amalgamated figures, which are useless for determining 
if  claims are legitimate or not. So I sent my first official FOI to Parliament in 
January 2005 seeking the names and salaries of  MPs’ staff. I chose this query af-
ter interviewing a political reporter who said it was an open secret in the parlia-
mentary lobby that MPs had family members on the payroll, some of  whom did 
little or no work. This request was refused by Parliament. I appealed internally 
and then to the information commissioner who adjudicates such cases. My case 
came to a dead end on 4 September 2006 when the speaker of  the House issued 
a certificate providing an absolute exemption from FOI on the grounds that the 
release of  this information would be “likely to prejudice the effective conduct of  
public affairs.”38
I moved on and asked for other types of  allowances, specifically the Additional 
Costs Allowance (ACA), which “reimburses Members of  Parliament for ex-
penses wholly, exclusively and necessarily incurred when staying overnight away 
from their main UK residence...for the purpose of  performing parliamentary 
duties.”39 At this time the ACA was £23,000 a year in addition to an MP’s basic 
salary of  £60,000. This request was also refused and I appealed to the informa-
tion commissioner and then to the Information Tribunal. On 26 February 2008, 
after a two-day hearing in which the head of  the Fees Office was questioned, the 
tribunal ruled in my favor that the parliamentary expense system was “deeply 
unsatisfactory” and the:
laxity of  and lack of  clarity in the rules for ACA is redolent of  a 
culture very different from that which exists in the commercial 
sphere or in most other public sector organisations today...in our 
judgment these features, coupled with the very limited nature 
of  the checks, constitute a recipe for confusion, inconsistency 
and the risk of  misuse...the shortfall both in transparency and in 
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accountability is acute.40 
The judges ordered full disclosure. However, on the last day allowable, Parlia-
ment appealed the ruling to the High Court. I defended my case and on 16 May 
2008 the High Court ruled that Parliament had to disclose the information.41 
The expenses of  the 14 MPs in the test case were published, but the ruling 
committed Parliament to publishing the records for all 646 MPs. A deadline was 
set for October 2008, but the date came and went, as did another deadline of  
December. The scale of  the publication was set out in the following parliamenta-
ry answer by Nick Harvey to a question about the digitization process:
It is therefore planned that the scanning of  some 1.3 million 
documents and first stage redaction to remove details such as 
addresses, telephone numbers, banking details and account num-
bers will be undertaken under secure conditions by a contractor 
familiar with providing services to Government and Parliament 
whose staff  have been security cleared.42
On 15 January 2009, leader of  the House Harriet Harman announced that mo-
tions would be brought forward on 22 January to exempt Parliament from the 
FOIA. That would mean no expenses published—ever. There was public uproar 
and the proposal quickly capsized under the weight of  all the negative publicity. 
Still there was no indication of  when Parliament would publish the information. 
Eventually the entire unredacted digitized dataset was copied onto a hard drive 
and leaked. John Wick, the middleman who brokered the deals between an 
unknown parliamentary insider and various newspapers, explained the source’s 
motivation for the leak: 
critical information—particularly the removal of  addresses from 
the files—would lead to many of  the scams never being publicly 
exposed. The source was adamant that the key thing was that 
both the information and the way in which it was handled should 
be in the public domain and that its release was in the public 
interest.43
A few newspapers picked one or two items from the data, but it wasn’t until the 
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Daily Telegraph paid £110,000 for the entire dataset, and proceeded to roll out 
weeks of  stories from its investigations, that the scandal reached critical mass. 
Media and public attention focused on high-profile and unusual claims such as a 
duck house and Douglas Hogg’s moat cleaning, however there were many more 
serious abuses such as fraud for which five MPs and two lords were imprisoned. 
A formal audit of  the expenses system reported that it was “deeply flawed” and 
a total of  389 MPs were ordered to return some £1.3milion.44 
How did this advance the digital revolution? Crucial to the leak was the fact 
that without FOI and the subsequent court battle, the data would not have been 
digitized. If  not digitized there would have been no disk to leak. “Only the total 
claimed by each MP is kept in electronic format,” the Commons’ FOI officer 
Bob Castle had stated in a letter to the information commissioner. If  not leaked, 
Parliament would have been able to secretly expand and reinterpret the narrow 
exemption for sensitive personal information. Indeed, the official version eventu-
ally published in June 2009 excised all the worst abuses.45
As it was, the leak of  the unredacted digital dataset prevented Parliament from 
interpreting and censoring the data and instead reporters and citizens viewed 
it raw. The resulting exposés “destabilized the government,” and led to a wave 
of  resignations (the speaker plus six ministers) and nearly a fifth of  MPs (120) 
stepped down at the 2010 election.46 In the first days of  publication, parliamen-
tarians called on the metropolitan police to open a criminal investigation into 
the Daily Telegraph for possession of  stolen property, but this went nowhere due 
in large part to the weight of  public opinion against MPs.47 A British election 
study from June 2009 showed 95 percent of  the public aware of  the scandal, 91 
percent very angry about it, and 82 percent saying MPs who abused the system 
should resign immediately. 
 
The scandal has been described in superlative terms both for its journalistic and 
political impact. It was “one of  the biggest stories in modern British history,” 
one that “rocked cultural, political and journalistic spheres.”48 Politically, it was 
an “incendiary device thrown directly at the political establishment,” and pro-
duced a scandal that “shook Westminster to the core.”49 It led to reforms of  the 
MP allowances system and, with the Parliamentary Standards Act of  2009, the 
establishment of  the Independent Standards Authority. According to Worthy 
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and Hazell et al., the scandal also led to “intense discussion of  constitutional 
reform” with Gordon Brown and David Cameron vying in the general election 
of  2010 over who could offer the most reform.50 Cameron’s platform included 
public recall power of  MPs, which became the Recall of  MPs Act 2015. A new 
government was elected in May 2010 on a mandate of  transparency and the UK 
went from being an open data backwater to ambitious world leader.51 The (Lon-
don) Times summed up the changes with a front-page article headlined “New 
order”:
Parliament was forced to surrender its ancient right to run its 
own affairs on a momentous day in which the Speaker, Michael 
Martin, paid for the scandal over MPs’ expenses with his job. 
The Prime Minister announced that the financial affairs of  MPs 
would be taken over by independent regulators.52 
However, the reforms were not nearly radical enough. Importantly, expense 
information was still not directly accessible to the public, but rather mediated 
by a newly created bureaucracy. Perhaps as a result, the media exposed a steady 
stream of  MPs abusing public expenses, and Parliament’s reputation worsened. 
A 2012 YouGov poll found just 26 percent of  people thought most MPs were 
honest, down from 34 percent in 2010. Only 13 percent thought most MPs were 
in touch with the daily lives of  their constituents in 2012 and the proportion of  
people believing MPs were principled was down six points to 26 percent. The 
majority of  people, 72 percent, agreed with the view that “not enough had been 
done to stop MPs wrongfully claiming expenses and MPs are probably getting 
up to the same abuses as before,” compared to 13 percent who thought Parlia-
ment had learned from the scandal and new MPs would behave better.53
WikiLeaks
Freedom of  information exists on a continuum with mega-leaks at the far 
end and it was only a matter of  time, I thought, before other political systems 
were hit by digitized mega-leaks similar to the MPs’ expense scandal. I start-
ed research on my next book The Revolution will be Digitised and came across 
WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange in March 2010 at a Norwegian investigative 
journalism conference.54 During lunch, he told me about secret footage he’d ob-
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tained that showed “collateral murder by a major Western government,” which 
he later said was the United States. This was the “Collateral Murder” video.55 At 
that time, I was impressed with WikiLeaks because their publication of  previ-
ously secret information indicated a willingness and boldness to push the limits 
of  transparency. However, I came to the conclusion that Assange was an incon-
sistent and unreliable source, and his actions, as I witnessed them, ran counter 
to his professed ideologies. I focused my reporting elsewhere and it was through 
another WikiLeaks volunteer that I was leaked a copy of  the entire unredacted 
dataset of  the U.S. diplomatic cables, described at the time as “the largest set of  
confidential documents ever to be released into the public domain.”56 Initially, I 
tried analyzing the dataset myself  but at a quarter of  a million records, it was too 
vast. Also, the material was of  a sensitive nature, and as such I needed legal, ed-
itorial, and institutional support. I therefore partnered with the Guardian and we 
worked on a months-long investigation culminating in a series of  articles from 
28 November 2010 to January 2011. The data set was also shared with the New 
York Times who ran a parallel set of  stories.
Leaks are often committed with the hope of  “destabilizing the epistemic 
space.”57 They create an existential challenge for the secret state but can be 
restorative for democracy. They can highlight the doublethink of  states when 
rhetoric of  openness and access to information is applied directly.58 This was 
clearly seen when, in January 2010, secretary of  state Hillary Clinton gave a 
speech devoted to Internet freedom:
On their own, new technologies do not take sides in the struggle 
for freedom and progress, but the United States does. We stand 
for a single Internet where all of  humanity has equal access to 
knowledge and ideas.59 
She described a new kind of  “information curtain” that was descending across 
much of  the world where countries erected electronic barriers to stop their 
citizens accessing portions of  world networks. She urged private companies to 
stand up to foreign governments who sought to control the Internet and prom-
ised that the U.S. government would support technology designers to circumvent 
blocks or firewalls. However, when it was the U.S. government’s information 
that was duplicated and disseminated, there was an entirely different response. 
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U.S. officials announced an investigation into WikiLeaks and Clinton said the 
government would take “aggressive steps” to hold responsible those who “stole” 
the data.60 U.S. Army intelligence analyst Chelsea Manning (at the time Pfc. 
Manning went by Bradley Manning) was arrested in connection with the leak 
on 27 May 2010 and transferred to the Marine Corps Base in Quantico, Virginia 
on 29 July 2010. The soldier’s ill treatment at the facility was described by State 
Department spokesman Philip Crowley as “ridiculous and counterproductive 
and stupid.”61 This candor prompted Crowley’s resignation two days later, 
while Manning was transferred to a medium-security jail in Fort Leavenworth, 
Kansas. The soldier was convicted by a military judge in July 2013 of  17 of  22 
charges, including violations of  the Espionage Act, for copying and disseminat-
ing classified military field reports, State Department cables, and assessments 
of  detainees held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. However, she was acquitted of  the 
most serious charge, aiding the enemy. In August 2013 Manning was sentenced 
to thirty-five years in prison with the possibility of  parole after eight years. 
During the trial Manning read from a 35-page statement, saying she leaked the 
cables “to show the true cost of  war.”62
In this case the leaker was not protected by public opinion. A Pew Research 
Center study in December 2010 found that 60 percent of  those aware of  the 
diplomatic cables story believed leaking State Department cables harmed public 
interests. And 31 percent thought it was in the public interest. Interestingly, the 
public made a distinction between WikiLeaks itself  and the press handling of  the 
data, with 39 percent saying the media had struck the right balance reporting on 
the leaks and 14 percent saying they held back too much. 
The publication of  the U.S. diplomatic cables marked a definitive shift toward 
what some called “radical transparency” and others called “massive, vigilante 
disclosure.”63 Some credited the cable publication with the Tunisian uprising 
in January 2011, an event which led to the Arab Spring.64 An article in Foreign 
Policy, “The First Wikileaks Revolution?” claimed that site disclosures “acted as 
a catalyst: both a trigger and a tool for political outcry.”65 However, WikiLeaks 
itself  did little reporting on the data. That was the job of  the journalists. And it 
was the source who provided the information and who faced the consequences. 
Some have conflated Assange’s subsequent arrest in December 2010 with the 
publication of  the diplomatic cables, when in fact it was the result of  sexual 
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assault and rape allegations made by two women in Sweden. 
In time, the hype about this novel leaking site was replaced with a more tem-
pered view: “Wikileaks only created the illusion of  a new era in transparency” 
said Roberts, and early advocates had “overstated the scale and significance of  
the leaks.”66 WikiLeaks role in of  itself  has been consistently overstated, how-
ever the leaked information and subsequent articles allowed for a greater under-
standing about the reality of  politics, diplomacy, and corruption. For this reason, 
an argument can be made that the leaks had an immediate impact on the Arab 
Spring protests, in Tunisia especially, because it gave people an unvarnished view 
of  their rulers as real, fallible human beings. Amnesty International’s secretary 
general, Salil Shetty, has said that: 
The year 2010 may well be remembered as a watershed year 
when activists and journalists used new technology to speak 
truth to power and, in so doing, pushed for greater respect for 
human rights.67
So much of  elite political systems depend on an illusion of  infallibility and 
superiority. Among the revelations reported in the Guardian were many instances 
where elites were shown to be fallible humans acting in ways childish, immor-
al, or corrupt.68 The cables also revealed numerous examples across the world 
where an elite few were privately benefiting from public resources.69 I believe 
these revelations illuminated the costs of  secrecy, and how it had aided elite 
structures of  governance while hindering public accountability of  public resourc-
es. The publication also challenged authoritarian views that tend to maximize 
the risks of  disclosure while minimizing those of  secrecy. Officials claimed 
publication would result in “untold incalculable damage to the nation’s military 
personnel, national security, and diplomatic efforts,” however as no clear evi-
dence emerged of  significant damage they had to retreat from this position.70 
Perhaps as a result, courts may be more skeptical in the future of  claims of  the 
catastrophic consequences of  disclosure. 
In these two case studies, we can see that digitization was a means to shake the 
pillars of  elite rule, not just in the UK but the United States, Middle East, and 
around the world. How successful these attempts have been is very much open 
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to debate. What is certain is that political elites felt increasingly challenged and, 
where public opinion was on their side, fought back using state institutions. In 
some instances, such as the Arab Spring, the successful challenge of  autocratic 
regimes did not lead to the promised expanding of  the democratic franchise. 
Rather it resulted in a shift to a different group of  elites operating in a similarly 
autocratic tradition.71
Transparency and Technology as Tools of Oppression
Technology has the ability to magnify power, but rates of  adoption vary. Small 
groups and individuals can adapt faster to new technology than large institu-
tions, and so for a time technology empowered small groups and individuals in 
relation to the state as in the two cases presented above. Security engineer Bruce 
Schneier estimates that it took about a decade for traditional power to adapt to 
new technologies, but once they did, their powers were magnified exponential-
ly.72 Tom Steinberg, the creator and founder of  UK civic technology organiza-
tion My Society, writes in an essay:
few people are less happy these days than privacy campaigners. 
The fact that everyone carries sensor laden mobile phones makes 
national security agencies more powerful than they were before. 
Even where privacy protecting technologies exist, they cannot be 
said to be equal and opposite in effect to the ubiquitous comput-
ing we now live amongst. Mobile computing is a permanently 
power shifting technology that permanently empowers the securi-
ty services.73
Technology now exists that enables companies and governments to monitor our 
conversations, commercial transactions, and movements, and to make predictive 
decisions about us based on this data. Not only are there more technologies to 
surveil citizens, but also more entities that want to do so. The Internet business 
model has become one based on surveillance.74 It used to cost states money and 
resources to spy on its citizens, but now thanks to technology, we have a variety 
and scope of  surveillance that is “unprecedented in human history.”75 This was 
made clear in June 2013 when the Guardian and Washington Post began publish-
ing a series of  articles based on revelations from Edward Snowden, a former 
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systems administrator of  the National Security Agency. 
Snowden Revelations
Before Snowden, little attention was given to the rise of  state surveillance and 
official secrecy that followed terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, particularly 
related to intelligence agencies. The UK’s first information commissioner, Rich-
ard Thomas, warned the country was “sleepwalk[ing] into a surveillance soci-
ety,” and American journalist Ted Gup criticized the media for failing to report 
what has been “one of  the more significant stories of  our lifetime - an emerging 
‘secretocracy’ that threatens to transform American society and democratic insti-
tutions.”76 A large part of  the problem for journalists, including myself, was the 
dearth of  information. In the UK, intelligence agencies are exempt from FOIA 
and in the United States several scholars have noted the rise in official secrecy af-
ter the 11 September 2001 attacks.77 There are very few legitimate ways to access 
the information needed for verification and to meaningfully report on security 
services. The rise in outsourcing and privatization further erodes access.78 Added 
to this has been the dramatic rise in the prosecution of  whistleblowers and jour-
nalists by the U.S. government.79 
Despite, or perhaps because of, this rise in official secrecy, Snowden went to 
journalists Laura Poitras and Glenn Greenwald with information obtained while 
working as a contractor for the National Security Agency. The revelations began 
with an article describing how the NSA was accessing phone records of  millions 
of  U.S. Verizon customers using a secret bulk warrant.80 A day later top secret 
documents were published alleging the NSA had obtained direct access to the 
systems of  Google, Facebook, Apple, and other U.S. Internet companies in a 
program called Prism, though these companies denied the existence of  back-
doors.81 Another article disclosed that the NSA’s British equivalent, the Govern-
ment Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), also had access to Prism and 
additionally was tapping fiber optic cables to intercept data flowing through the 
global Internet in a program called Tempora.82 Other revelations included NSA 
surveillance of  world leaders hacking operations, intercepting phone data, and 
“nearly everything a user does on the internet.”83
 
Public opinion to the leaks was mixed with 45 percent saying it served the 
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public interest while 43 percent thought it had harmed it. A majority, 56 per-
cent, thought a criminal case should be made against Snowden, with 32 percent 
opposed.84 The U.S. government charged Snowden with theft of  government 
property, and two charges under the 1917 Espionage Act, which together would 
incur a maximum sentence of  thirty years in prison. The Espionage Act does 
not allow for public interest or whistleblower defense. Additionally, the United 
States submitted extradition requests to numerous countries. Snowden eventual-
ly sought asylum in Russia.  
As a result of  the Snowden disclosures, public awareness about online privacy 
and government surveillance grew, and a number of  specialist reporters now 
cover security services. There is even a well-funded organization devoted to this 
coverage, the Intercept, employing some of  the journalists who worked with 
Snowden. Technology companies began building encryption into their products, 
and on 2 June 2015, the USA Freedom Act became law, ending the bulk collec-
tion of  phone call metadata directly by the NSA. However, phone companies 
still had to retain it, only now the government would have to get approval from 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. In the UK, three reviews were 
undertaken on security services and surveillance. I sat on one, the Independent 
Surveillance Review Panel, and from June 2014 until the publication of  our 
report 14 July 2015 we met, took evidence, and had site visits to assist our inves-
tigation.85 In my view, our report did not place enough emphasis on the harm 
resulting from mass, or bulk, surveillance and I did not agree with the statement 
“we have seen no evidence that the British Government knowingly acts illegally 
in intercepting private communications.”86 That is only because we were unable 
to see enough evidence to make a judgment either way. This is the difficulty of  
holding the secret state to account. Claims and evidence cannot be verified or 
tested. 
Security services are adamant that digital technology and communications 
have led to a large and expanding number of  threats, not just with international 
terrorism but industrial, military, and state espionage, organized criminality, and 
child sexual exploitation. Theresa May, as home secretary, put it bluntly while 
arguing for unprecedented spying powers on citizens online: “this is quite simply 
a question of  life and death, a matter of  national security. We must keep on 
making the case until we get the changes we need.”87 Bulk and mass surveillance 
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has been the state’s answer to the problem of  digital technology and online crim-
inality and the disclosures by Edward Snowden reveal that intelligence agencies 
did not wait for a democratic mandate to set up these surveillance systems. As a 
result, there were concerns that they were operating outside the law. 
In the UK, the government’s ultimate response to Snowden has been to intro-
duce the Investigatory Power Bill, which would legitimize the current practices 
of  mass or “bulk” surveillance.88 The French government passed a sweeping 
surveillance law in May 2015.89 In 2016, Japan’s Supreme Court upheld the gov-
ernment’s blanket surveillance of  the country’s Muslim community.90 
These are worrying signs for the future of  democracy, as a society that per-
mits “the unchecked ascendancy of  surveillance infrastructures cannot hope 
to remain a liberal democracy.”91 Richards identifies two main harms resulting 
from surveillance: it chills human thought and it leads to abuse of  power.92 
Psychological studies have shown that people resort to more conformist and 
compliant behaviors when they think they are under surveillance.93 Two recent 
studies have provided empirical evidence of  the “chilling effect” of  surveillance. 
Elizabeth Stoycheff  found that a majority of  participants, when made aware 
of  government surveillance, were significantly less likely to speak out in hostile 
opinion climates.94 Jonathon Penney found a large, statistically significant, and 
immediate drop in total views for privacy-sensitive Wikipedia articles after June 
2013 (the publication date of  the Snowden articles), and that the drop was long 
term.95 If  people are deterred from informing themselves or researching contro-
versial subjects, they will inevitably be less informed and “our broader processes 
of  democratic deliberation will be weakened.”96 
Conclusion
Technology can be used to strengthen democratic values and processes or to 
damage them. Certainly, digitized information is harder to control, as seen in 
all three case studies. However, it is perfectly possible to bend technology to suit 
the needs of  bureaucracies and power, which was made clear via the Snowden 
revelations. “Without a conscious and deliberate effort to use the new technolo-
gy of  telecommunications in behalf  of  democracy, it may well be used in ways 
harmful to democracy.”97 It matters who is made transparent—the citizen or the 
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state. More than at any other time in history, the state can match its desire to 
know “with the means to collect, monitor, and (even) predict the behaviors of  
their subjects/citizens.”98 Whether or not this makes “us” safer depends on who 
this “us” refers to and how we define safety and freedom.
It also matters what is made transparent and the context of  publication. Trans-
parency when combined with technology has created leaks on an industrial 
scale. Such mega-leaks allow the public to pull back the curtain on elite struc-
tures of  government. What they find may not be pretty, nor able to withstand 
public scrutiny. The case studies show how journalism is integral not only to 
identifying useful civic information, as evidenced in MPs’ expenses, but also 
maximizing the public good from leaked information while minimizing harm. 
Data dumps are not capable of  this nuance. In the three case studies put for-
ward, content and context materially affected public opinion of  the leaks. People 
were more in favor of  mediated leaks than data dumps, and more in favor of  in-
formation about how public officials spend public money than national security 
or defense. Sanctions against the leaker/publisher lessened when public opinion 
viewed the leaked material as strongly in the public interest. 
Transparency and technology have led to a digital revolution, which in turn has 
ushered in a new form of  monitory democracy. Communicative abundance and 
global interconnection mean the democratic franchise can expand and deep-
en. As technology creates new ways for citizens to have their rights and inter-
ests heard and represented in the community, this has led to a “clash between 
twenty-first century expectations, technologies and transparency challenging a 
nineteenth-century model of  democracy and participation.”99 Our democratic 
institutions need to wake up to this new reality and radically reform in line with 
increased expectations of  citizen equality. If  they fail, they risk eroding public 
confidence and democratic institutions may no longer be seen as serving the 
public interest but the private interests of  an elite few. 
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